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I. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. MAINTENANCE CONTRACTORS
T HERE WERE ONLY a handful of cases in the past year deal-
ing with the government contractor defense. Only one
made it to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals level. In
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, Army pilots who were involved
in a helicopter crash sued the manufacturer, alleging that the
crash was caused by the tail fin's separation, which resulted from
a crack originating near the base of the fin spar.' Plaintiffs
sought to recover against DynCorp, who was contracted to main-
tain the Army's aircraft. 2 Although cracks had been discovered
in the UH-1 line of helicopters and had become the subject of
both a 1997 Airworthiness Directive issued by the FAA and a
1998 Advisory Bulletin by Bell Helicopters, the Army chose not
to follow those recommendations as it is not bound by either the
FAA's issuance of Airworthiness Directives or the manufac-
turer's Service Bulletins.' Bell, the manufacturer, warned the
Army about the possibility of such cracks and recommended ad-
ditional visual inspections.4 The Army determined that its heli-
copters were not engaged in heavy lifting; therefore, they did
not need to follow the recommended inspection protocols.5
Plaintiffs alleged "that DynCorp was negligent under Alabama
law for failing to properly maintain the helicopter and/or to
make necessary repairs."6 DynCorp moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the government contractor defense.7 The
circuit court affirmed the district court's decision that the gov-
ernment contractor defense extends to service contracts such as
the maintenance contract between DynCorp and the Army.'
This case merits review as it provides an excellent summary as to
the admissibility of expert testimony and affidavits in support of
and in opposition to a summary judgment.
B. APPLICATION TO FEDERAL OFFICER JURISDICTION
In Teague v. Bell Helicopter Services, Inc., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas, while considering
a petition to remand the case back to state court, held that the
potential application of the government contractor defense was
sufficient to create federal jurisdiction and avoid remand.9 In
this case, an employee's survivors filed suit against the dece-
1 328 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003).
2 Id. at 1331.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. a 1331-32.
6 Id. at 1332.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1345.
11 No. 4:03-CV-004-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12,
2003).
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dent's employer, Bell Helicopter, alleging that his death was
caused, in part, by exposure to asbestos during his employ-
ment.1" Pursuant to a contract with the government, "Bell used
asbestos in the process of manufacturing military helicopters."'1
The decedent was exposed to that asbestos while working for
Bell Helicopters.' 2 Textron removed the case under "federal of-
ficer" removal jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1) to which
Bell agreed.1" Textron had to show "that Bell: (1) [was] a 'per-
son' within the meaning of the statute; (2) 'acted pursuant to a
federal officer's directions and that a causal nexus exist[ed] be-
tween the defendant's actions under color of federal office and
the plaintiff s claims'; and (3) assert[ed] a 'colorable federal de-
fense."'"4 The court found that Bell met the first two require-
ments and then examined whether Bell sufficiently presented a
federal defense.' 5 The court held that in order to avoid re-
mand, Bell only needed to provide a "colorable federal de-
fense." It did not need to prove the asserted defense, but only
to articulate its apparent applicability to the case before the
court.'
6
C. WAIVER OF DEFENSE
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that the failure to timely plead the government
contractor defense as an affirmative defense in accordance with
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a
waiver.' 7 In New Orleans Assets v. Woodward, the defendant failed
to formally plead the government contractor defense in accor-
dance with Rule 8(c), even though it had filed answers to the
plaintiffs original and amended complaints, a co-defendant's
cross-claim, the plaintiffs second, third, and fifth amended
complaints and a supplemental and amended cross-complaint."8
Additionally, the defense was not raised as an issue in arguments
over summary judgment. 19 The defendant first attempted to as-




14 Id. at *3.
15 Id. at *3, *11.
16 Id. at *12-13.
17 New Orleans Assets v. Woodward, No. 01-2171, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382,
at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2003).
18 Id. at *4.
19 Id. at *4 n.1.
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sert the defense "on the final day which motions could be filed
in compliance with [the] Court's Scheduling Order, and just
one week before the discovery cut-off date. '20 The defendant
failed to produce any evidence showing that the facts supporting
the affirmative defense were only discovered recently.21 Based
on the foregoing, the court held that the defense was waived.2
II. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had the opportunity to consider whether or not
the Federal Aviation Act applied to a passenger's claim for in-
jury resulting from items falling from an overhead bin.2 3 In Al-
len v. American Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff was injured when a
computer fell from an overhead bin after arrival at the gate.24
The bin was opened by an unidentified passenger who stood up
while the seatbelt light was still on, but after the aircraft had
come to a stop at the terminal gate.25 The plaintiff contended
that American Airlines was negligent because it operated the air-
craft in a careless and reckless manner contrary to the require-
ments of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) by: failing to require the
unidentified passenger to remain seated; failing to give a post-
landing warning; and allowing the overhead compartments to
be overloaded. 26 The court noted that the Third Circuit has
held that the Federal Aviation Act "establishes the applicable
standard of care in the field of air safety, generally, [and] thus
preempt[s] the entire field from state and territorial regula-
tion."27 While the court found that allegations of negligence
based on Section 91.13 sufficiently alleged a federal standard of
care, the court also found that the regulation did not require
the defendant to provide a warning immediately prior to dis-
embarking. 28 This was based, in part, on 14 C.F.R. § 91.519,
20 Id. at *5.
21 Id. at *5-6.
22 Id. at *6.
23 See Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
24 Id. at 373.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 374-75.
27 Id. at 374 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir.
1999)).
28 Id. at 375.
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which only requires a pre-takeoff warning.29 Since there was no
breach of a federal standard of care, the defendant was entitled
to summary judgment on that cause of action."0 Of interest, the
court analyzed other cases which have considered the applica-
tion of Section 91.13(a) to the conduct of air carriers and found
that application of Section 91.13(a) is reserved only for serious
misconduct where a potential for harm is incontestably high. 1
Here the court noted that the aircraft was at a stop and there
was simply no "threat of imminent, dire physical injury to Plain-
tiff and his fellow passengers while their plane sat stationary. '"32
This opinion briefly summarized several cases, facts, and issues
that courts have looked at to determine whether or not the car-
rier may be liable for injuries as a result of objects falling from
overhead bins. 3
In a case that is close to home, specifically mine, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida consid-
ered whether the Federal Aviation Act, which governes all quali-
fications and capacity to operate commercial aircraft in
interstate commerce, preempted state criminal laws.34 Hughes v.
11thJudicial Circuit involved two America West Airline pilots who
were assigned as the crew on a commercial flight from Miami,
Florida to Phoenix, Arizona. 5 Shortly after pushback, officers
from the Miami-Dade police department asked the Transporta-
tion Security Administration for permission to stop the flight
and have it return to the gate on the basis that officials at a se-
curity checkpoint smelled alcohol on the pilots' breath. 6 The
aircraft was recalled, and approximately two hours later, the
Miami-Dade police department took the pilots' breathalyzer
test.37 Their breath-alcohol level exceeded the 0.08 limit of Flor-
ida law, but was less than the federal criminal limit of 0.10.38
"America West permanently fired [both pilots], and the Federal
Aviation Administration permanently revoked their Airman and
Medical Certificates. ' 39 The State of Florida sought to prosecute
29 Id.
30 Id. at 378.
31 Id. at 376.
32 Id. at 377.
33 Id. at 377-78.
34 See Hughes v. llthJud. Cir., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
35 Id. at 1336.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1336-37.
38 Id. at 1337.
39 Id.
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the pilots criminally for having operated an aircraft with an alco-
hol level in excess of the 0.08 state limit.4" The court did a de-
tailed analysis of whether it should abstain from interfering with
the state court prosecutions, but ultimately decided that federal
abstention was inappropriate.4 1 In analyzing whether or not
there was federal preemption, the court noted that there are
three situations where preemption can arise: express preemp-
tion, field preemption, and conflict preemption.4 2 "Field pre-
emption exists where either: (1) the pervasiveness of the federal
regulation precludes supplementation by the States; (2) the fed-
eral interest in the field is sufficiently dominant; or (3) the ob-
ject the federal law seeks to obtain and the character of
obligations federal law imposes reveal the same purpose."4 The
court determined that the comprehensive legislation provided
under the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) evidenced Congress's intent "to preempt the field of
pilot qualifications and capacity to fly a commercial airliner in
interstate commerce. ' 44 Additionally, the court noted that 14
C.F.R. expressly preempts state law except where there has been
"actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property. '45 As a result
of the court's decision that the Federal Aviation Act preempted
this specific area, the court issued a writ of habeas corpus and
enjoined the State of Florida from criminally prosecuting the
pilots.46
B. No PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
In Casey v. Goulian, the court considered whether the Federal
Aviation Act sufficiently preempted plaintiffs' state law nuisance
claims alleging that the defendants were involved in noisy and
dangerous stunt plane flights over their homes.47 The court
noted that the Federal Aviation Act does not provide a private
cause of action to enforce its standards nor does it completely
preempt the field of noise regulation.48 Citing Vorhees v. Naper
Aero Club, Inc., the court found that "[t]here is no . . .broad
40 Id,
41 Id. at 1339-40.
42 Id. at 1341.
43 Id. at 1342.
4- Id. at 1343.
45 Id. at 1344 (citing 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App I, § XI (B)).
46 Id. at 1346.
47 273 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Mass. 2003).
48 Id. at 138.
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language in the Federal Aviation Act specifically prohibiting
state and local governments from regulating airflight in any way
whatsoever," and as a result, there is no complete preemption of
the field so as to allow removal of the state law claim based upon
federal question grounds.4 9
III. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
The only aviation case dealing with the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA) was an offshoot of the Egypt Air crash of
1999. In the case of Allen v. Egypt Air, Inc., the court found that
a decedent's stepchildren were not entitled to recover under
DOHSA as "a stepchild does not qualify as a 'child' under
DOHSA."50 The court further determined that none of the
stepchildren qualified as dependent relatives under DOHSA
(no claim was made that the stepchildren were financially de-
pendent upon the decedent), and as a result, the court held
they were not entitled to assert claims under DOHSA.51
IV. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
Only two cases made it to the circuit court level dealing with
the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).52 The Act was germane to
a half dozen district court decisions.
A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAw
In King Jewelry Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., King Jewelry sought
to recover for damage to a shipment of candelabra.53 The
candelabra were valued at $37,000. 5' King Jewelry had con-
tracted with a professional packager in Florida to package and
ship the candelabra. 55 The shipper then contracted with Fed-
eral Express when other companies refused to ship such high
value items.56 Federal Express told the shipper that he could
pay an extra $185 for the declared value of $37,000. 57 The extra
- Id. at 139-40 (citing Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc., 272 F.3d 390, 404
(7th Cir. 2001)).
50 Allen v. Egypt Air, Inc. (In reAir Crash Near Nantucket Island), No. 02-CV-
00101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13877, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2003).
51 Id. at *6, *8.
52 49 U.S.C. § 410701 (2004).
53 316 F.3d 961, 962 (9th Cir. 2003).
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value was paid to Federal Express. 58 However, the air waybill
provided that the highest allowed declared value was $50,000,
except that "items of extraordinary value" were limited to a de-
clared value of $ 5 0 0 .51 "Items of extraordinary value" were de-
fined in FedEx's Service Guide and referenced and
incorporated into the air waybill.6" "Items of extraordinary
value" were defined to include items such as artwork, jewelry,
furs, precious metal, and negotiable instruments.61 When the
candelabra arrived damaged, King Jewelry filed suit in Califor-
nia state court, and the case was removed to federal court by
Federal Express.6 2 Federal Express then "moved for partial sum-
mary judgment, seeking to limit its liability to $500.00 per
crate. ' 63 King Jewelry alleged the $500 per crate limit was inap-
plicable because the parties amended the contract under Cali-
fornia law (presumably due to the payment for the additional
declared value).64
The circuit court determined that the ADA preempted Cali-
fornia law, thereby preventing modification of the air waybill be-
tween the parties.65 The court held that "federal common law
governs contractual clauses that limit interstate carriers' liability
for damage to goods shipped by air. '66 The court also found
that the ADA preempts state law because "the modification that
King Jewelry [sought] to impose pertains directly to the services
Federal Express offers. '67 Of note, when the court held that the
ADA preempted King Jewelry's state law claims, it also required
Federal Express to return the excess premium paid for the de-
clared value in excess of $500 per crate.68
In a case involving Florida's Whistleblower Act (FWA)69 , the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
considered whether or not the ADA preempted a plaintiffs
58 Id. at 962-63.
59 Id.




64 Id. at 964, see 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2004).
65 KingJewelery, 316 F.3d at 964.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 964 n.8.
68 Id. at 966.
69 FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1) (2004).
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claim.7" In Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., the plaintiff was
terminated from his employment at an aircraft parts repair facil-
ity that held an FAA certified repair station certificate.71 The
plaintiff was supposedly terminated due to workplace miscon-
duct, although the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated due
to his complaints that his employer was not properly repairing
parts in accordance with the Federal Aviation Regulations and
was not properly filling out required FAA paperwork. 2 The
plaintiffs ex-employer moved for summary judgment on the ba-
sis that the ADA preempted the FWA claim and that the ADA's
Whistleblower Protection Program73 provided the exclusive rem-
edy for the plaintiffs claim. 4 Finally, the employer argued that
a claim under the Whistleblower Protection Program was time-
barred because the plaintiff had failed to file a complaint with
the Department of Labor within 90 days as required by the
Act.
75
The court determined that, while an aircraft could fly with
one generator not working (which was the type of part princi-
pally repaired by the plaintiffs employer), the "aircraft genera-
tor maintenance [was] sufficiently related to air carrier service"
as to be preempted by the ADA.76 The court then found that
the Whistleblower Protection Program incorporated into the
ADA was applicable, but that the plaintiff had failed to file a
timely complaint, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim was time-
barred under the Whistleblower Protection Program.77
In yet another case involving FWA, the District Court of New
Hampshire held that the Florida Whistleblower Act was pre-
empted by the ADA.78 In Simonds v. Pan American Airlines, the
plaintiff filed suit in Florida state court claiming he was dis-
charged in violation of Florida's Whistleblower Act.79 Pan Am
removed the proceeding to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida where it was thereafter transferred
70 Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
71 Id. at 1361.
72 Id.
73 49 U.S.C. § 42127.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1362-63.
76 Id. at 1364.
77 Id. at 1365.
78 Simonds v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 03-11-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17328, at *17 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2003).
79 Id. at *1; FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1).
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to the District of New Hampshire.8" Pan Am then moved to dis-
miss the claim on the basis that the ADA preempted the plain-
tiff's claim.81 "Simonds [was] an experienced commercial pilot,
with approximately 20,000 hours of flight time. '"82 He was
scheduled to fly a four-leg flight from New Hampshire to Maine
to Pittsburgh to Florida and then back to Portsmouth, New
Hampshire.13 "The entire trip should have required approxi-
mately eight hours of flight time and 13 and one-half hours of
duty time."84 The Federal Aviation Regulations preclude a pilot
from being assigned or accepting an assignment of a schedule
that requires duty for more than sixteen hours in any twenty-
four hour period.85 Due to unexpected aircraft mechanical
problems after the first three legs of the trip, it appeared to Si-
monds that he would not be able to complete the trip without
running afoul of the 16 hour limit.86 Based on the foregoing,
he reported his concerns to Pan Am and refused to fly the last
leg of the flight.87 As a result, the flight was delayed until an-
other pilot took over the flight.88
The court analyzed whether or not the ADA would preempt
the Florida Whistleblower Act claim under these facts.8 " The
court cited the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Branche v. Airtran
Airways, and noted that it is the specific facts of a retaliation
claim and not the statute that determines whether or not the
claim is preempted by the ADA.90 The court also found that the
ADA's incorporation of the Whistleblower Protection Program
evidenced Congress's intent "to preempt state-law whistleblower
claims related to air safety."91 The court determined that the
plaintiff's conduct in refusing to fly the aircraft put in jeopardy
the air carrier's ability to render "service" to its passengers by
go Simonds, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17328, at *1.
81 Id. at *1-2.
82 Id. at *3.




87 Id. at *4-5.
88 Id. at *5.
89 Id. at *11.
90 Id. (citing Branch v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003)).
91 Id. at *14 (citing Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 496 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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threatening to ground the plane. 92 As such, his claim was pre-
empted by the ADA.93
B. No PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
In Skydive Factory, Inc. v. Maine Aviation Corp., the plaintiff filed
suit for property damage suffered after landing as a result of
"defendants' improper inspection and maintenance of the air-
plane."94 The defendant removed the suit to federal court on
federal question grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 asserting "that
the Federal Aviation Act completely preempts any state-law
cause of action for inspection and maintenance."95 Upon plain-
tiff's motion to remand, the court noted that "[t]he FAA ha[d]
promulgated regulations that deal with aircraft maintenance
and inspection, 14 C.F.R. pt. 43 [and] prescrib[ed] the qualifi-
cations for who can do them and how they are to be done."96
Nonetheless, citing American Airlines v. Wolens, the court found
that terms and conditions in a contract between parties, as op-
posed to a state law or regulation, are not preempted by the
Federal Aviation Regulations.9 7 While that case dealt with prop-
erty damage, as opposed to personal injury, the court found no
reason to distinguish between the two, and, noting that other
courts have found that safety-related claims for personal injury
were not preempted, found no basis for preemption of claims
dealing solely with property damage.9" As a result, the case was
remanded for lack of federal question jurisdiction.99
In Branche v. Air Tran Airways, Inc., the court considered
whether the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Florida's
Whistleblower Act (FWA). °° Mr. Branche worked for Air Tran
as their only aircraft inspector at Tampa International Air-
port. 101 In this capacity, he was required to conduct safety in-
spections of Air Tran's aircraft after they had been serviced by
Air Tran's maintenance crew prior to takeoff.1 2
92 Id. at *17.
93 Id.
94 268 F. Supp. 2d 61, 62 (D. Me. 2003).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. (citing Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 (1995)).
98 Id. at 62-63.
99 Id. at 65.
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In 2001, one of Air Tran's DC-9 aircraft landed at the airport
with one of its two engines running at temperatures exceeding
FAA safety guidelines.' ° The plaintiff recommended that the
engine be subjected to a detailed physical inspection. 104 In-
stead, one of Air Tran's maintenance personnel and two mainte-
nance workers climbed into the aircraft and conducted a high
power run in an effort to ascertain the airworthiness of the en-
gine.105 The plaintiff alleged "that none of these individuals
were qualified to undertake this diagnostic maneuver." ''"6 After
the aircraft departed Tampa without the recommended service,
"the engine overheated during its flight to Atlanta and the plane
subsequently was taken out of service.' 0 7 Mr. Branche reported
Air Tran's alleged regulatory violations to the FAA.'08 Both he
and Air Tran were contacted regarding his allegations, and Air
Tran realized that he was the source of the FAA's knowledge of
the incidents in question.10 9 Approximately two weeks later, Air
Tran accused Mr. Branche of falsifying his time card and steal-
ing approximately two hours of pay, and he was terminated."0
As a result, Mr. Branche filed suit in Florida state court under
the FWA."'
Air Tran removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdic-
tion." 2 The district court granted the motion for removal and
also granted Air Tran's motion for summary judgment on the
basis that the plaintiffs FWA Claim was preempted by the
ADA." 3 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[p]re-emp-
tion may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether
Congress's command is explicitly stated in the statute's language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."'1 4 On ap-
peal the Eleventh Circuit noted that the ADA expressly states
that a state "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other












114 Id. at 1253 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1990))).
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route, or service of an air carrier .... ,I The court considered
whether Branche's claim under the Whistleblower Act was pre-
empted because it had the effect of regulating services provided
by Air Tran. n6 The court made a careful analysis of other opin-
ions on whether retaliatory discharge claims were preempted by
the ADA and ultimately concluded that this claim was not pre-
empted by the ADA." 7 The court's reasoning was that safety is
not a basis on which airlines compete for passengers, and as
such, it does not serve the purposes of the ADA to preempt state
law employment claims related to safety."' Because Branche's
FWA claim was fundamentally an employment discrimination
claim and did not impact any area in which airlines compete,
the court concluded that his claim did not relate to "services" of
the air carrier within the meaning of the Act.' 19 The court went
on to note that in 1999 Congress amended the ADA to include
the Whistleblower Protection Program (WPP), which provided
similar protection to Florida's Whistleblower Act.' 2° The court
noted that Air Tran fired the plaintiff because he had reported a
violation to the FAA.' 21 This did not affect the providing of ser-
vices by Air Tran. 2 2 Had the plaintiff claimed that Air Tran
fired him in retaliation for refusing to allow an aircraft to take
off, the court would have likely ruled that state law, under those
facts, did affect services.1 21
In Alasady v. Northwest Airlines Corp., plaintiffs brought claims
against Northwest alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act I24
and the Minnesota Human Rights Act 125 , as well as tort claims
for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 26
The claims arose out of Northwest's refusal to allow the three
plaintiffs, all Muslim men of Middle Eastern descent, to board a
flight from Minneapolis to Salt Lake City on September 20,
2001, just nine days after the events of September 11th. 127 Al-
115 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)(2004)).
116 Id. at 1253-54.
117 Id. at 1259-60.
118 Id. at 1258.
119 Id. at 1261.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1263.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2004).
125 MINN. STAT. Ann. § 363.03 (2004).
126 No. 02-3669, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3841, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003).
127 Id. at *1.
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though the plaintiffs had been fully interviewed by both state
and federal officers and were considered to pose no security
threat, the crew and passengers on Northwest's flight refused to
fly the aircraft with them on board.12 Plaintiffs were ultimately
provided alternate travel with Delta Airlines after a nearly four-
hour delay. 129 The court noted that the purpose of the ADA was
to maximize reliance on competitive market forces to further
the efficiency, innovation, and low prices of air transportation
services. 30 To ensure that the states would not undo the federal
deregulation, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act,
prohibiting states from enforcing any law relating to rates,
routes, or services. 1 ' The court determined that the preemp-
tion of state law claims for infliction of emotional distress or
from claims arising from conduct alleged to be the product of
discriminatory motives would do nothing to promote the pur-
poses of the ADA.132 As a result, the court held that the plain-
tiffs claims were not preempted.133
In Hannibal v. Federal Express Corp., the plaintiff sought to re-
cover for damage to musical equipment shipped via Federal Ex-
press.134 The plaintiff claimed that Federal Express breached
the agreement to deliver the goods the next day and to honor
insurance claims placed against the equipment for which addi-
tional value had been declared.'35 Federal Express removed the
case to federal court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction.1"
The court noted that there was no federal question presented
on the face of the complaint, and pursuant to the well-pled com-
plaint rule, there was no basis for removal. 137 While the court
noted that federal preemption by the ADA is ordinarily a de-
fense, it did not appear on the face of the complaint as a de-
fense, and therefore, did not authorize removal.1 3 8 The court
also noted that under the doctrine of complete preemption,
when Congress "so completely pre-empt[s] an area of law [so] as
128 Id. at *7.
129 Id. at *8.
130 Id. at *29.
131 Id. at *29-30.
132 Id. at *31-32.
133 Id. at *32.
134 266 F. Supp. 2d 466, 468 (E.D. Va. 2003).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 469.
138 Id.
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to display an intent to not merely preempt a certain amount of
state law, but also to transfer jurisdiction from state to federal
courts," then preemption may provide a basis for federal juris-
diction.139 The court noted that the ADA did not preempt all
state acts, but only those which affected rates, routes, or ser-
vices. 4 ° As such, there was no complete preemption which
would form the basis of federal jurisdiction.14 1
In All World Professional Travel Services v. American Airlines, the
court denied American Airlines' motion to dismiss the com-
plaint alleging causes of action under a state law breach of con-
tract claim and a federal RICO claim. 4 2 All World was a travel
agency, which, in the months after the September 11 th trage-
dies, assisted American in processing refunds to passengers
whose travel was cancelled immediately after September 11 th.143
Shortly after September l1th, "American unilaterally claimed
that refund requests for passengers unable to travel as a result of
the September 11 th tragedies should not be processed through
the ARC [a clearinghouse through which funds are collected
from various travel agencies on behalf of carriers], but should
be sent directly to American instead." '44 "All World was una-
ware of American's purported change in policy, and continued
to process refunds through the ARC. Thereafter, American be-
gan issuing 'Debit Memos' (demands for money), charging All
World an 'administrative service charge' and 'penalty fee' of
$100 or $200 per ticket refunded through the ARC" and
processed by All World.'4 5
The court carefully considered the purposes of the ADA and
found the ADA was adopted to encourage development and to
obtain air transportation service based upon competitive market
forces.1 46 The court noted that the ADA retained a savings
clause to protect "the ability of states to control non-economic
matters concerning airlines within their borders."147 All World
brought three state law claims for breach of contract, unjust en-
richment, and a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. 48
139 Id.
140 Id. at 470.
141 Id.
142 282 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
143 Id. at 1164.
14- Id. at 1165.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1167.
147 Id. at 1167-68.
148 Id. at 1165.
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The court found that All World's breach of contract claim fell
under the scope of American Airlines v. Wolens, which held that
"Court enforcement of a private contract does not constitute 'a
State's' enactment or enforcement of law.' "149 The court found
that part of All World's breach of contract claim did, however,
derive from enactment of state law, specifically Virginia law,
which held that the amount American charged in the Debit
Memos constituted a penalty prohibited by Virginia law.1 5° The
court went on to determine that All World's breach of contract
claim on the basis of unjust enrichment and claims for declara-
tory and injunctive relief, as stated, did not relate to American's
prices or services, and therefore, were not preempted by the
ADA.151
C. BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In Kings Choice Neckwear, Inc., v. DHL Airways, the court con-
sidered whether the ADA would give rise to federal question ju-
risdiction supporting removal.152  The plaintiffs originally
brought this case in the state court of New York "on behalf of a
proposed class of individuals who received packages shipped
from abroad" via DHL.15 3 The plaintiffs alleged that DHL
"charged... some recipients of international packages an undis-
closed and unauthorized 'Processing Fee' and [sought] dam-
ages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of New York
General Business Law §349 (deceptive business practices), breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment."'5 4 DHL "removed the ac-
tion to federal court asserting diversity and federal question
jurisdiction. "155
The plaintiffs moved for remand, which was ultimately denied
by the court on the basis that there did not appear to be more
than $75,000 in damages claimed, thereby preventing diversity
jurisdiction.156  The court noted that, "[i]n determining
whether a claim arises under federal law, the court 'examines
the "well pleaded" allegations of the complaint and ignores po-
149 Id. at 1168 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29
(1995)).
150 Id. at 1168-69.
151 Id. at 1171-72.
152 No. 9580, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2003).
153 Id. at *1.
154 Id.
155 Id. at *1-2.
156 Id. at *11.
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tential defenses."' 157 Federal question jurisdiction exists only if
it is presented on the face of the complaint.15 "[A] defense re-
lying on the preemptive effect of a federal statute does not nor-
mally provide a basis for removal" except in "cases in which
Congress has either expressly provided that a preempted state
claim be removed to federal court ...or, in which a federal
statute has been held to wholly displace the state-law cause of
action through so called 'complete preemption'. ' 159 The court
noted that the Supreme Court has only found complete pre-
emption to apply in three contexts: the Labor Management Re-
lations Act, the Employer Retirement Income Security Act, and
the National Bank Act.160 The court noted that, while the ADA
"may provide a defense to plaintiffs [sic] state-law claims,...
[no] provision of the ADA expressly create [d] federal question
jurisdiction or provide[d] that state claims relating to the ADA
may be removed to federal court. 161
1. Air Transportation Safety & System Stabilization Act
In Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Coverium Riickversicherung, a Ca-
nadian Reinsurer sued a German Reinsurer in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.' 6 2 Jurisdic-
tion was to be based upon Section 408 (B) (3) of the Air Trans-
portation Safety & Stability Act.1 63 The District Court dismissed
the action for lack of jurisdiction.6 The Second Circuit re-
viewed the decision de novo.16
5
The court noted that the Act has five principal titles.166 "Ti-
tles I, II, III, and V provide financial and tax relief to the airline
industry, including federal support for airline insurance, and af-
firm the President's decision to spend $3 billion [on getting re-
elected; just kidding] on airline safety and security. '  Section
408(b) has two jurisdictional provisions. 168 Section 408 (b) (3)
provides that the District Court of the Southern District of New
157 Id. at *5 (quoting Ben Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)).
158 Id. at *6.
159 Id. at *6-7.
160 Id. at *7.
161 Id. at *8-9.
162 335 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2003).
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York has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property,
personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the ter-
rorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. '"169 Plain-
tiff alleged its losses increased as a result of 9/11 and that the
defendant failed to honor its reinsurance (or retrocession)
agreement. 170 The plaintiffs losses would not have occurred
"but-for" 9/11.171
The court held that, while plaintiffs losses increased due to
9/11, that did not constitute a "claim" under the Act.172 The
court noted that no fact concerning 9/11 needed to be adjudi-
cated in the Act and that the cause of plaintiffs increased losses
was irrelevant. 173 The only issue was that plaintiffs incurred
losses that were not shared by the defendant per the agree-
ment.174 The court commented that Congress could not have
possibly intended every lawsuit traceable to 9/11 to be brought
in the Southern District of New York.175 The court limited its
decision to that line of cases and affirmed the dismissal.' 76
2. General Aviation Revitalization Act
In Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., survivors and successors
of victims sued to recover for damages from the crash of a Bell
helicopter based upon negligence, strict products liability, war-
ranty, and fraud. 177 The trial court granted Bell's motion for
summary judgment based upon the eighteen year statute of re-
pose set forth in the General Aviation Revitilization Act
(GARA).1 78
On appeal, the court considered whether any exceptions ap-
plied. 179 The helicopter, a model 205A-1, was originally sold in
1976.180 The tail rotor yoke was the original equipment from
169 Id. at 55-56 (citing Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. § 408(b)(3) (2001) (enacted)).
170 Id. at 57.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 58.
173 Id. at 57.
174 Id. at 53.
17- Id. at 58.
176 Id. at 59-60.
177 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
178 Id.; Pub. L. No. 103-289, as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-102 § 3(e), 111
Stat. 2215, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2004) [hereinafter GARA].
179 Butler, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764-65.
180 Id. at 765.
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the manufacturer.'"' The plaintiff alleged Bell misrepresented
and withheld a variety of information from the FAA: first, in
1989, when it revised the helicopter's maintenance manual to
increase the operational life of the tail rotor yoke from 4,000 to
5,000 flight hours; later in 1996, when it revised the manual to
require a new dimensional test for inspection of the yoke; and
finally, throughout a ten-year period in which it failed to report
at least five accidents involving in-flight fatigue failures of rotors
that had less than 2,400 hours of use. 182 The appellate court
held that part 21.3(a) of the FAA's regulations put an affirma-
tive duty on Bell to report the military failures of the identical
yokes.' 3 Bell's failure to report such to the FAA fell within
GARA's exception arising from withholding information from
the FAA.' 8 4 The summary judgment was reversed. 8 5
In Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the widow of a helicopter
pilot sued for wrongful death on theories of strict product liabil-
ity, negligence, and warranty.'86 The accident occurred during
a fire-fighting mission.'8 7 Just before the accident, the pilot,
who had extensive helicopter experience, called on the radio
that he had a "flame-out."'8 8 The Bell 206 has a turbine engine
and fuel system consisting of three tanks. 8 9 The engine feeds
from only one tank and is automatically replenished from the
other two."' The helicopter had a history of flame-outs due to
problems with the fuel system failing to transfer fuel to the main
tank. 9 1 A system retrofit designed to make the system more reli-
able was issued in 1982, and the modification became
mandatory per a 1989 Airworthiness Directive. 19 2 Plaintiff ar-
gued that the fuel system was defective and that the 1982 retrofit
made the whole fuel system subject to GARA's rolling statute of
limitation.'93 Defendant alleged that the replacement of a few
components did not start a new limitation period for the whole
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 770.
184 Id.; GARA supra note 178, § 2(b) (1), 2(a), 3(3).
185 Butler, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75.
186 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003).
187 Id. at 252.
188 Id.
189 Id.
19o Id. at 252-53.
191 Id. at 254.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 256.
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system, only the components replaced."' Defendant appealed
the adverse jury verdict.9 5 While the appellate court agreed
that GARA's rolling statute only applied to the components re-
placed, and not the fuel system as a whole, it found substantial
evidence to support the jury's finding that one of the new com-
ponents caused the accident.1 16
V. WARSAW CONVENTION
A. STANDING TO SUE
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed the following issues: (1) whether the sub-
rogee of the owner of goods had standing under the Warsaw
Convention 9 ' to bring an action against the carriers consisting
of two freight forwarders and Alitalia as the air carrier and (2)
whether the contract for carriage between the parties was one
which included ground transportation incidental to the trans-
portation by air, or whether the ground transportation was a dis-
tinct leg in the instance of combined carriage. 8 Alitalia alleged
that Commercial Union lacked standing to sue as its insured was
not in privity of contract with Alitalia."'9 The court carefully an-
alyzed the Warsaw Convention as well as the facts of the case and
noted that the freight forwarders considered themselves to be
agents of Alitalia. 200 Based on the foregoing, the court deter-
mined that a contract with the freight forwarders, as agents of
Alitalia, constituted a contract between the owner of the goods
and Alitalia. 2°1 Since Commercial Union stood in the shoes of
its insured as a subrogee, it had standing to bring suit under the
Convention against Alitalia. 2
Alitalia also argued that the contract between the parties was
one of successive transportation in accordance with Article 31 of
the Convention, and therefore that Commercial Union had the
194 Id.
195 Id. at 252.
J96 Id. at 258.
197 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 405105 (West 2004) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
198 347 F.3d 448, 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2003).
199 Id. at 457-58.
200 Id. at 462.
201 Id. at 463.
202 Id. at 463-64.
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burden of proving the damage to the cargo took place during
the air carriage portion of the shipment.2 °3 Commercial Union
argued that the transportation was one principally of transporta-
tion by air with incidental land carriage in accordance with Arti-
cle 18 of the Convention.2 °4 Under Article 18, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the damage occurred during that
portion of the shipment that occurred by air.2 °5 In this case, the
goods were shipped from Italy and received at JFK Airport.20 6
There was no apparent damage to the container, and the air
waybill was accepted with the goods being in good condition at
JFK. 2°7 The goods were then shipped to Commercial Union's
insured via ground transportation and were again received in
apparent good condition until after the container was opened,
and the goods were discovered to be damaged. 20 8
The court found that although there was no provision for
ground transportation on the air waybill, "people often expect
door-to-door delivery, a service that is simply not possible with-
out the aid of transportation other than aircraft. '2 9 The court
further found that the presumption of damage during the car-
riage by air was a provision inserted in the Convention to avoid
the precise question before the court, namely, when the damage
occurred. 210 Finally, the court found that, while the presump-
tion may be a hardship on carriers, there was also a concession
granted in exchange for the limitation of liability carriers enjoy
under the Warsaw Convention. 21 The court found that "the im-
portant factor in applying presumptive liability is not whether
the air carrier itself has agreed to delivery, but simply whether
the carrier is party to any contract for air carriage that contem-
plated delivery by another means. 21 2 Here it found that there
was no way that the goods could have been delivered in accor-
dance with the air waybill without carriage by land and, as such,
such land carriage was incidental to the carriage by air.21 '3 As a
result, the court found that the damage to the cargo presump-
203 Id. at 464.
204 Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 18).
205 Id.; Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 18.
206 Commercial Union Ins., 347 F.3d at 456.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 465.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 466.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 467.
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tively occurred during the flight.214 As far as the receipts indi-
cating no damage at JFK Airport, the court noted that, while
"[r]eceipt by the person entitled to delivery . . . without com-
plaint [is] prima facie evidence" of delivery in good condition,
"[w] ithout inspection, however, such a statement could only ap-
ply to apparent damage. '215 The court also noted that the Con-
vention allows "a seven-day time period in which a party entitled
to delivery may complain of damage to a shipment."21 ' Here the
court found that the damage was timely reported and that the
notation on the air waybills of receipt in good condition was not
controlling.217
B. EFFECT ON SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
In Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker International, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision concerning
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention2 1 8 and the federal
court's jurisdiction to consider state law claims.219 "Siemens, a
German manufacturer, made computer chips in Singapore, and
sent them to San Jose, California, for testing. '221 When the car-
tons containing the boxes of computer chips were sent back to
Siemens' factory in Singapore after testing, some of the contain-
ers contained a brick instead of the circuits. 22 ' The value of the
circuits was $235,000.222 "Siemens had purchased insurance
from Albingia Versicherungs, which paid Siemens about
$235,000 for the stolen chips [and then] brought this subroga-
tion claim against all the firms in the shipping chain" in the
California state court alleging claims under the Warsaw Conven-
tion and state law claims.223 "Eva Air, an international air car-
rier, removed the case to federal court based on the Warsaw
Convention claim. '2 24 After discovery, all but one defendant set-
tled.225 Schenker, a freight forwarder, operated a warehouse in
214 Id. at 468.
215 Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 26(1)).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.
219 344 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2003).
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California located outside the airport.226 "Siemens' [air] way-
bills contained a limitation of liability supplementing . . . the
Warsaw Convention. '227 In the event that the Warsaw Conven-
tion was found not to apply, then there was a limit of $20.00 per
kilogram for damage. 228 The parties eventually stipulated to
facts which strongly supported the inference that the computer
chips were stolen by Schenker's employees, and, as such, that
the loss occurred outside of the airport.229 As a result, the War-
saw Convention would not apply.23 ° When the district court
held that the limitation in the air waybill of $20.00 per kilogram
was effective, the plaintiff then argued that the case should have
been remanded to state court because the basis for federal juris-
diction, the Warsaw Convention, no longer applied. 2 1 The cir-
cuit court held that, when jurisdiction was originally invoked in
federal court under the Warsaw Convention, the court had sup-
plemental jurisdiction to hear and decide the state law claims.232
That jurisdiction did not end once the Warsaw Convention was
found to be inapplicable. 233 Albingia argued that state law
should apply to its claim and that California law precluded the
$20.00 per kilogram limitation. 2 4 The court held that federal
common law applied and, "[u]nder federal common law, the
limit on liability is valid ... if the shipper has reasonable notice
of it and a fair opportunity to purchase the means to avoid it."235
Here the court found that Siemens was on notice of the limita-
tion as it had purchased insurance to cover its potential loss. 236
Based on the foregoing, the private $20.00 per kilogram limita-
tion contained in the waybill was enforceable. 23 7
C. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACCIDENT
In Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the Second Circuit re-
viewed a summary judgment granted in favor of Lufthansa





230 Id. at 935.
231 Id. at 934-35.
232 Id. at 936.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 939.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 939-40.
237 Id. at 940.
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lence could not constitute the basis for an "accident" under the
Warsaw Convention.238 In this case, the plaintiff was returning
to his seat after the captain had announced that the aircraft may
encounter turbulence.23 9 While the pilot characterized the tur-
bulence as light or moderate, the plaintiff had difficulty main-
taining his balance and only made it to his seat by holding onto
other seatbacks as he progressed down the aisle. 24" The aircraft
on which he flew had a center fuel tank that protruded into the
passenger cabin, providing a ceiling height of only 6'3" at one
point.241 Plaintiff was 6'4" tall.242 As the plaintiff approached
the protrusion, something caused him to violently strike his
head on it, breaking his nose, dislodging a dental bridge, and
causing his vision to blur and nose to bleed.243 Plaintiff was able
to make it back to his seat.24 4 Plaintiff subsequently filed suit
against Lufthansa seeking recovery for his injuries under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention.245 Lufthansa moved for summary
judgment arguing that mild to moderate turbulence is an ex-
pected part of normal flight and, therefore, could never meet
the definition of an "accident" as defined in Air France v. Saks.24 6
According to Saks, an accident is an "unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger. '247 The
circuit court noted that the plaintiffs witnesses described the
turbulence to be more severe than that described by the pilot
and also noted the Supreme Court's comment in Saks, that in
"cases where there is contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of
fact to determine whether an 'accident' as here defined caused
the passenger's injury.1248 The circuit court rejected the district
court's decision that light or moderate turbulence could never
constitute an accident and reversed the grant of summary
judgment. 249
In another case where the courts wrestled with what consti-
tutes an "accident," the United States District Court for the East-
238 339 F.3d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 2003); Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.







246 Id. at 160-61; see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
247 Magan, 339 F.3d at 161 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
248 Id. at 162, 165 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
249 Id. at 166.
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ern District of New York dealt with the carrier's and plaintiffs
opposing motions for summary judgment on whether the plain-
tiffs injury constituted an accident under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.25 ° In Girard the plaintiff was injured while exiting a bus
that had transported her from the terminal to the aircraft.25 1 As
the plaintiff stepped from the bus, she lost her balance and fell,
allegedly incurring injuries. 25 2 American argued that an acci-
dent under the Convention must be a risk that is characteristic
of air travel.253 Since the plaintiff fell from a bus, American ar-
gued it was not a risk inherent to air travel. 25 '4 The court re-
viewed various post-Saks cases and noted there were two lines of
opinions on the definition of an "accident," one broadly con-
struing the term and the other doing so narrowly.255 Following
Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, the court noted the conflicting
cases showed a decisive pattern: "the extent to which the circum-
stances giving rise to the accident fall within the causal purview
or control of the carrier-or at least within its practical ability to
influence-as an aspect of the operations of the aircraft or air-
line. ' 256 After analyzing the Warsaw Convention and the defini-
tion of "accident" as set forth in Saks, 2 5 7 supra, the court
determined that, while it was clear that the plaintiff was within
the control of the carrier and, therefore, was in the process of
embarking or disembarking, whether or not her falling from the
bus was an accident as considered by the Warsaw Convention
was an issue to be determined by the trier of fact (the jury).251
In Miller v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the court addressed
whether or not the Warsaw Convention applied to plaintiffs'
claims for deep vein thrombosis (DVT) as a result of the seating
configuration of the aircraft.259 Plaintiffs brought claims under
the Warsaw Convention and various state law claims including
claims for product negligence, common carrier negligence,
250 Girard v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-4559, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506,
at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2003).
251 Id. at *1.
252 Id. at *2-3.
253 Id. at *19.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at *21-22 (citing Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651,
657 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
257 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
258 Girard, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at *31.
259 260 F. Supp 2d 931, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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product liability, and breach of warranty. 260 The court, follow-
ing the Supreme Court's opinions in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng,261' and Saks, supra, held that the plaintiffs' state law claims
were barred on the basis of complete preemption under the
Warsaw Convention.262 The court also considered the applica-
tion of the Convention to loss of consortium claims and noted
that "the Convention extends to claims by non-passengers based
on events during international air travel" and that its application
is not merely personal to claims made by passengers. 63 As a
result, the court held that loss of consortium claims by a non-
passenger are subject to the Convention.264
In Scala v. American Airlines, Inc., the court considered
whether providing the plaintiff with an alcoholic beverage, as
opposed to the non-alcoholic beverage requested, could consti-
tute an accident that would allow recovery under the Warsaw
Convention.265 Plaintiff was on an international flight and re-
quested a glass of cranberry juice, but was instead served and
consumed cranberry juice with alcohol.266 As a result of the
mix-up, the plaintiff allegedly "suffered physical injury to his
heart. '267 The plaintiff suffered from a preexisting heart condi-
tion.268 A suit was filed in state court and removed by American
Airlines. 269 Thereafter, American moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the basis that the plaintiffs claims did not consti-
tute an accident under the Warsaw Convention. 270 The court
decided that the provision of an alcoholic beverage when one
was not requested constituted an "unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger. '271 American
argued that in order to qualify as an "accident" the event in
question must "arise out of a risk that is peculiar to air travel. 272
The court determined that the characteristics of air travel in-
260 Id. at 933.
261 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
262 Id. at 937.
263 Id. at 940.
264 Id. at 941; see also Diaz Lugo v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 373 (D.P.R.
1988).






271 Id. at 179-180 (applying Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
272 Id. at 180.
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creased the plaintiff's vulnerability to a mistaken drink substitu-
tion and that such constituted an "accident" as defined under
the Convention. 273
Recently, a New York district court was asked to determine
whether or not a carrier's response to an in-flight medical emer-
gency constituted an "accident" under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.2 74 In Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, plaintiffs brought
suit for injuries allegedly sustained during an international
flight.275 Mr. Fulop had a prior history of a heart attack in
1994.276 During this 1998 flight, the plaintiff began to experi-
ence chest pains similar to what he recalled having experienced
when he had his prior heart attack.277 He made one request to
Malev's flight crew for assistance who then made an announce-
ment requesting a physician.278 An orthopedic surgeon, who
was not a heart specialist, was onboard and examined the plain-
tiff.279 During the initial checkup and several follow up check-
ups, the doctor noted that the plaintiffs pulse rate, blood
pressure, and other indicia of a heart attack were normal.28 °
The doctor gave the plaintiff an injection of pain killer from the
flight's medical kit, which seemed to alleviate the symptoms. 281
As a result, this flight from Budapest to New York was not di-
verted.21 2 Shortly after landing in New York, plaintiff began ex-
periencing increased pain again and, upon arrival, an
ambulance took him to a hospital where he received a triple
bypass two days later.23 Plaintiff alleged that had the flight
been diverted, it would have allowed him to obtain medical
treatment which would have avoided the permanent damage he
incurred as a result of the delay in obtaining medical treat-
ment.284 The court, at a bench trial, noted that the carrier had
followed its own procedures for dealing with in flight medical
emergencies and that those procedures were consistent with in-
273 Id. at 181.
274 Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 244 F. Supp. 2d 217, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
275 Id.







283 Id. at 219-20.
284 Id. at 220.
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dustry standards. 2 5 As a result, the court found that the greater
weight of the evidence did not support a finding that an "acci-
dent" under the Warsaw Convention had occurred and entered
judgment for the carrier.28 6
D. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SINGLE OPERATION
In Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., plaintiff brought suit
seeking recovery for thermal burns incurred during a flight.2 7
The plaintiff had been using an ice pack which had become
warm and she asked the flight attendant to cool it.28 8 The flight
attendant placed the bag inside an airsickness bag with a piece
of dry ice .28 The plaintiff lived and worked in Virginia and she
originally booked her flight with British Airways from Denver to
London leaving on September 2nd and returning on September
8th.2 "9 Three days later, she booked a roundtrip American Air-
lines flight from Washington, D.C. to Denver leaving on August
29th and returning on September 8th.291 Plaintiff left on her
trip as planned, but made several changes to her return arrange-
ments.292 Ultimately, she ended up returning on September
10th via a British Airways flight from London to Denver, and
after spending three hours in the Denver airport, she took the
American Airlines flight from Denver to Washington, D.C. via
Chicago.293 It was on the Denver/Chicago leg of the flight that
the plaintiff sustained her burns.294 Plaintiff brought suit three
years after the incident.2 5
American Airlines alleged that the flight was part of a single
operation of international travel and, therefore, subject to the
limitations of the Warsaw Convention, including the two-year
statute of limitations.296 In determining whether this was do-
mestic carriage or part of a singular operation of international
carriage, the court reviewed Article One of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and noted that the carriage would be deemed to be one
285 Id. at 221.
286 Id. at 222.
287 277 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93 (D.D.C. 2003).
288 Id. at 95 n.6.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 93.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 94.
293 Id. at 94-95.
294 Id. at 95.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 97.
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undivided transportation if it had been regarded by the parties
as a single operation.297 The court noted that travelers are un-
likely to consider the question of whether the transportation was
a single operation and, as a result, the courts used an objective
standard to determine the party's intent based upon specific
documentary indicia.298 Based upon the foregoing, the court
held the travel was a single operation, that the Convention ap-
plied to the Denver/Chicago flight, and that the Convention's
two-year statute of limitation barred plaintiff's claim. 299
E. EMBAREKNG AND DISEMBARING
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
considered what constituted "embarking" in Kalantar v. Luf-
thansa German Airlines. °° In this case, the plaintiff, an Iranian
traveling with an Iranian passport, was in the process of check-
ing in to depart the United States on a trip to Germany. 0 1
Upon arriving at the ticket counter, the agent wanted to search
the plaintiffs baggage that was being checked onto the air-
craft. 0 2 In response to the plaintiffs request as to why his lug-
gage had to be searched when no one else's luggage was being
searched, the agent only said that it was due to an FAA security
directive but refused to disclose the directive to the plaintiff.3 0 3
The agent also told the plaintiff, within earshot of other passen-
gers, that he "must know that the United States Government is
against all Iranians. '' 30 4 When the plaintiff refused to leave the
Lufthansa counter and refused to allow the hand search of his
luggage, Lufthansa's personnel called the police who eventually
arrested the plaintiff and took him away in handcuffs. 5 Plain-
tiff filed suit, alleging discrimination, defamation, false impris-
onment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.30 6
Lufthansa alleged plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by
the Warsaw Convention.0 7 The court carefully reviewed many
cases dealing with what constitutes "embarking," and this case
297 Id. at 96 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 1 (3)).
298 Id. at 96-97.
299 Id. at 100.
300 276 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003).
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provides an excellent summary of same.30 8 The court noted that
courts have generally focused on: "(1) the passenger's location
at the time of the injury; (2) the passenger's activity at the time
of the injury, and (3) the degree of control exercised by the
airline over the passenger" at the time of the injury in order to
ascertain whether or not it occurred during the process of em-
barking.30 9 With regard to the plaintiff's physical location, the
court found that his placement at the ticket counter prior to
being checked in and prior to receiving a boarding pass was too
remote from the actual process of getting on a specific aircraft
to constitute embarking.3 10 Secondly, the court found that the
plaintiff, checking in approximately an hour and a half prior to
the flight's departure time was too distant, temporally, to consti-
tute embarking. 11 The court also found that plaintiff was just
completing his initial check-in, which was the first of several
steps a passenger must take prior to boarding an aircraft. 2 Fi-
nally, the court noted that had the check-in procedure pro-
ceeded smoothly, the plaintiff would have been released to the
public area of the airport, as opposed to a secured area reserved
for passengers only.31 3 Finding that the plaintiff was not in the
process of embarking, the court denied the defendant's motion
for partial summary judgment seeking application of the War-
saw Convention to the plaintiffs case. 314
In Chips Plus, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., plaintiff sought recov-
ery for damage to some computer parts.3 5 The parts were
shipped from Finland to Warrington, Pennsylvania, which was
where the damage to the cargo was discovered. 6 The total loss
was alleged to be $117,715.77 The main issue before the court
was the difference between the Warsaw Convention, as originally
drafted, and its amendment under Montreal Protocol 4
(MP4)."33 Under the amended Warsaw Convention, a party as-
308 See id. at 10-12.
309 Id. at 10.
310 Id. at 12.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 13.
314 Id. at 14.
315 281 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760-61 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
316 Id. at 760.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 761; Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on
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serting jurisdiction must only show: "(1) that the goods at issue
where [sic] shipped via international transportation by aircraft;
(2) that, at the time the goods were shipped, the country of des-
tination and the country from which the goods were shipped
were signatories to the Amended Warsaw Convention; and (3)
that the damage to the goods in question occurred during car-
riage by air. 31 9 The court noted that MP4 created a rebuttable
presumption that the damage to goods took place during the
carriage by air, and as a result of the presumption, all require-
ments for jurisdiction and application of the Convention were
met. 20 Plaintiff attempted to avoid the Convention by alleging
that there were errors in the air waybill that did not conform
with the requirements of Articles 5 through 8 of the Conven-
tion.321 The court noted that an additional difference between
MP4 and the original Convention was that, under the original
Convention, if a carrier accepted goods without the air waybill
having been made out and containing the requirements con-
tained in Article 8, the carrier was not entitled to avail itself of
the limitations of the Convention. 22 However, under MP4,
"[n]on-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5 to 8 [do]
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract for car-
riage . .. including those relating to limitation of liability. 323
In the following case, the Southern District of New York con-
sidered whether or not adoption of MP4 necessarily resulted in
the U.S.'s adoption of the Hague Protocol.3 24 In Royal & Sun
Alliance Insurance v. American Airlines, Inc., the question was im-
portant because, under the Hague Protocol, there is no require-
ment to include agreed stopping places on the air waybill in
order to allow the carrier to avail itself of the limitations of the
Convention. 25 The U.S. had never formally adopted the Hague
28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Sec. Rep. No.
105-20 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4 or MP4].
319 Chips Plus, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 762-63.
320 Id. at 763 (citing Montreal Protocol, supra note 318 art. 18(5)).
321 Id. at 764 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 5-8).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 764-65.
324 Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague
Protocol].
325 Royal & Sun, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
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Protocol.326 However, the court carefully reviewed MP4 and
noted that Article XVII (2) of MP4 states "[r]atification of this
Protocol by any State which is not a party to the Warsaw Conven-
tion as amended at the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of
accession to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague,
1955 and by the Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975."327 On July
31, 2002, President George W. Bush sent a letter to the Senate
"for advice and consent for the proposition that the United
States could not have been bound by the Hague Protocol before
that date. '328 Plaintiffs argued that the letter indicated that the
U.S. had not formally adopted the Hague Protocol and also
noted that the U.S. is not on the list at the Polish Embassy as
ratifying the Hague Protocol.129 The court dispelled these
points and noted that, while the U.S. being listed in Poland
would clarify the point, the language contained in MP4 was suffi-
cient to show that the U.S. adopted the Hague Protocol by
adopting MP4 3 °
F. WHAT CONSTITUTES CARRIAGE BY AIR
In Fuller v. Amerijet International Inc., the Southern District
Court of Texas considered whether significant carriage by land,
during which loss to goods occurred, was part of carriage by air
so as to fall under the Warsaw Convention. 3 1 In this case, the
plaintiff contracted with Amerijet to transport a computer and
home theater equipment from Houston to Belize City by air.3 2
Plaintiff delivered the goods to Amerijet's warehouse at Hous-
ton's Bush Airport.33 Amerijet then hired Land Cargo to truck
the goods from Houston to Miami and Land Cargo delivered
the goods to Amerijet's warehouse at Miami International Air-
port.334 However, at that point the goods disappeared. 335 The
court found that, "[u] nder the convention, transportation by air
includes the entire period in which the air carrier is in charge of
the goods-not simply the time the goods are on the airplane. 336
326 Id. at 268.
327 Id. at 267.
328 Id. at 268.
329 Id.
330 Id.
33, 273 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
332 Id. at 902.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 902-03.
335 Id. at 903.
336 Id.
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Since it was "directly related to Amerijet's contractual obligation
to ship," the court held that the land carrier was the air carrier's
sub-bailee and that the loss of the goods in Miami constituted a
loss under the Convention. v As a result, the court granted
Amerijet's motion for summary judgment limiting its liability to
$20.00 per kilogram (i.e. "$9.07 per pound").338
G. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Pennington v. British Airways, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the is-
sue of when the two-year statute of limitations under the Warsaw
Convention 339 would expire and whose law would be utilized in
making that determination. a In this case, the plaintiff origi-
nally filed suit in Pennsylvania, and British Airways removed the
case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 34 1 The plaintiffs in-
jury occurred on July 13, 2000, when the plaintiff suffered a
stroke on an international flight with British Airways.34 2 Plaintiff
alleged that British Airways failed to provide appropriate medi-
cal treatment.34 3 Suit was filed on July 15, 2002.311 Under Penn-
sylvania rules, whenever the last day of any limitation period falls
on a Saturday or Sunday, such day is omitted from the computa-
tion.3 45 "[B] ecause July 13, 2002 was a Saturday, [under Penn-
sylvania law,] the action was timely filed on the following
Monday, July 15, 2002. ,,346 British Airways argued that the two
year statute of limitations in the Convention could not be ex-
tended by local law and, therefore, the failure to file the suit
prior to July 13 barred the action. 47 The court, reviewing Arti-
cle 29 of the Convention, noted that the "method of calculating
the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the
court" in which the suit is filed. 343 As a result, the court held
that Pennsylvania law was applicable and that the complaint was
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 29.
340 275 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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timely filed.349 This opinion includes citations to the drafting
history of the Warsaw Convention and bears closer examination
if this issue is present in your case.
H. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
In Mendez & Diaz v. American Airlines, Inc., the Southern Dis-
trict Court of New York considered the question of whether will-
ful misconduct constitutes an exception to the application of
the Warsaw Convention, thereby destroying federal jurisdic-
tion. 5° This case dealt with two complaints filed originally in
Texas against American Airlines and others as a result of the
November 12, 2001 American Airlines Flight 587 crash in Belle
Harbor, New York."' The flight was bound for Santo Domingo
in the Dominican Republic, and crashed shortly after takeoff,
resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew members
onboard. 52 American, during the time it was the sole defen-
dant (Airbus Industries and others were also named), timely re-
moved the action to federal court.3 53 Thereafter, plaintiffs
moved to remand to state court, alleging that the removal was
defective because American failed to obtain the consent of all
other defendants and that the willful misconduct of American
constituted an exception to the application of the Warsaw Con-
vention, thereby allowing the state law actions to survive.354 The
court noted that, at the time American removed the case to fed-
eral court, it was the only defendant and, therefore, was not re-
quired to obtain the consent of the other defendants. 55 In
analyzing the plaintiffs' motion for remand, the court noted
that the law puts the burden of demonstrating the existence of
removal jurisdiction on the party opposing the remand 6.3 5  The
court noted that the "well-pleaded complaint rule" normally
would prevent the application of federal jurisdiction based on
an affirmative defense. 357 This allows the plaintiff to formulate
its complaint in a manner designed to avoid federal law if it
349 Id. at 606.
350 No. 02: Civ. 6746, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7540, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2003).
351 Id.
352 Id. at *2.
353 Id. at *4.
354 Id. at *4, 17.
355 Id. at *17.
356 Id. at *5.
357 Id. at *6.
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chooses.158 However, the court noted that the "complete pre-
emption" doctrine would bar state law claims regardless of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.3 59 The court, noting the Supreme
Court's decision that the Warsaw Convention completely pre-
empts state common law claims regarding personal injuries suf-
fered during international air travel, held that there was federal
question jurisdiction over the matter. 6 ° Plaintiffs also argued
that the matter should be remanded because additional defend-
ants, namely Airbus Industries, who was not a "carrier" as de-
fined in the Warsaw Convention,36 were not covered by the
Warsaw Convention and, therefore, the state law claims contin-
ued to exist.3 62 The court, after analyzing the Convention and
noting that the term "carriers" does not make reference to
"manufacturers" of aircraft, nonetheless reviewed the Second
Circuit's holding that "the Warsaw Convention is to be con-
strued as to further its purposes to the greatest extent possible,
even if that entails rejecting a literal reading. '363 The court, not-
ing that a good argument could be made to include manufactur-
ers under the Warsaw Convention, nonetheless chose to simply
grant supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law
claims against Airbus.364 Based on the foregoing, the motion to
remand was denied.365
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR BAGGAGE CHECK
In the following case, the Eastern District Court of New York
was faced with the question of what constituted a baggage check
under the Warsaw Convention, 366 the requirements of same,
and the effect failure to comply with the requirements of the
Convention had upon the carrier's ability to limit its liability for
lost or damaged baggage. 67 In Schopenhauer, a passenger sued
Air France for baggage lost and damaged on international
358 Id.
359 Id. at *6-7.
360 Id. at *9 (relying on El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)).
361 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 197.
362 Mendez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7540, at *14.
363 Id. at *15. (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918
(2d Cir. 1978)).
364 Id.
365 Id. at *18.
366 Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 22(2).
367 Schopenhauer v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 255 F. Supp. 2d 81
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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flights.368 This case has a fairly long list and summary of numer-
ous cases dealing with both the original Warsaw Convention and
the courts' interpretation of the Convention as modified by
MP4.369 It also looks to opinions from Canada and the United
Kingdom concerning the requirements of a baggage check
under the Hague Protocol as both have been signatories to the
Hague since the mid-1960s.3 70 The plaintiff was traveling from
New York to the Republic of Benin, with "a four-day stopover in
Paris on the way to Benin, and a 13-hour stopover in Paris on
the way back to New York." '71 When the plaintiff arrived to be-
gin his trip in New York, he checked five bags and attempted to
carry on a sixth bag, but Air France required that he check it as
it was "too bulky. '372 Plaintiff was given a "limited release" iden-
tification tag in exchange for giving the sixth bag to the flight
attendant.3 73 When the flight arrived in Paris, the sixth bag did
not, and it did not turn up again until approximately six weeks
later, heavily looted.7 The plaintiff alleged lost and damaged
items totaling $69,000 in that bag. 73 Also in the lost bag were
the plaintiffs tickets for his remaining itinerary.3 76 The plaintiff
was delayed in getting a replacement ticket and, when continu-
ing his travel from Paris to Benin, checked six pieces of bag-
gage.377 Unfortunately, when he arrived in Benin, "two of the
pieces were 'completely destroyed' and thoroughly looted. 378
Plaintiff alleged that the contents of those bags were valued at
approximately $2,200.37 1
Air France moved for summary judgment under the Warsaw
Convention and also moved to dismiss the part of the plaintiffs
claim relating to the damages incurred on the Paris to Benin
flight.38 0 The basis of the motion to dismiss was that, having is-
sued replacement tickets to the plaintiff, a new contract for car-
riage was created and, therefore, New York no longer satisfied
368 Id. at 82.
369 Id. at 85-87.
370 Id. at 96.
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the requirements of the Convention as one of the jurisdictional
locales. 8 1 The court rejected this argument, noting that under
the Convention, international carriage could be through succes-
sive contracts of carriage without destroying the international
character of the flight.3 8 2
Of greater interest was the court's handling of the require-
ments of the Warsaw Convention as to Air France's liability for
the sixth bag that was lost on the New York to Paris flight.383
Under the original Convention, prior to its amendment by MP4,
a carrier could not limit its liability under the Convention unless
it issued a baggage check containing certain particulars, specifi-
cally, the ticket number of the passenger, the number and
weight of the baggage, and a statement that the transportation
was subject to the rules relating to the Convention. 4 Montreal
Protocol 4, which came into effect prior to this loss, however,
only requires an indication of the places of departure and desti-
nation (if the places of departure and destination are within a
single High Contracting Party), one or more agreed stopping
places in another state, and a notice to the effect that the War-
saw Convention may be applicable. 5 The "limited release"
given by Air France to the plaintiff for the sixth bag failed to
include the above requirements.8 6 Because Air France did not
base its motion for summary judgment as to the application of
the Warsaw Convention to the loss of the sixth bag on the basis
that the requirements of the current Convention for the bag-
gage ticket could be fulfilled by the information contained in
the passenger's ticket, the court did not grant Air France sum-
maryjudgment as to the application of the Warsaw Convention
to that bag.38y This opinion contains a detailed analysis of the
application of the current Convention and the utilization of the
passenger ticket and baggage ticket to constitute a single docu-
ment meeting the requirements of the Convention as modified
by MP4.
381 Id. at 85 n.6.
382 Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 28(1)).
3-3 Id. at 89.
384 Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 4).
385 Id. at 88 (citing Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 318 art. 4.).
386 Id. at 89.
387 Id at 99.
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J. NOTIFICATION OF DAMAGE
In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Federal Express Corp., the Northern Dis-
trict Court of California considered cross-motions for summary
judgment under the Warsaw Convention concerning damage to
cargo."' This case evidences the care that counsel involved in
these types of cases must take to ensure which version of the
Warsaw Convention properly applies to the case. While the
U.S.'s adoption of MP4 constitutes an adoption of the Hague
Protocol, counsel must nonetheless check to ensure that both
appropriate high contracting parties are signatories to the
Hague. 89 In this case, the plaintiff filed suit for damage to cer-
tain pharmaceutical goods which were transported from Ger-
many to the United States.3 9' The shipment was supposed to
arrive within two days, but ended up taking slightly more than a
week. When the goods were delivered by Federal Express in
California, many of the cartons were damaged resulting in plain-
tiffs claim that the entire shipment was destroyed. 9 2 As a pre-
liminary matter, the court determined which version of the
Warsaw Convention applied to the proceedings.39 3 Thereafter,
it determined that the evidence of record was sufficient to sup-
port a jury finding that Federal Express' acts or omissions were
done with the intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result, as set forth in
Article 22 of the Hague. 94 This standard differs from the origi-
nal Warsaw Convention which required the plaintiff to show
that the carrier engaged in willful misconduct.39 5
Also of issue in the case was whether or not notice of claim
was timely made.39 6 The two entities involved in the shipment
from Germany were Federal Express and Union-Transport. 9 7
Under the Hague Protocol and the language contained in the
air waybill, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the
carrier promptly after discovery of the damage and in no case
388 248 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
389 See id. at 907.
390 Id. at 906.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 907-08.
394 Id. at 910-11 (citing Hague Protocol, supra note 324 art. 22).
395 Id. at 910 n.3 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 197 art. 25).
396 Id. at 908-09 (citing Hague Protocol, supra note 324 art. 15).
397 Id. at 909.
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more than 14 days from date of receipt of the cargo. 98 Al-
though the plaintiff in this case had timely informed Federal
Express of its claim, it did not send notice to Union-Transport
until nearly 6 weeks after receipt of the goods. 99 However,
since the air waybills provided that a written complaint could be
made "to the Carrier whose Air Waybill was used, or to the first
Carrier or to the last Carrier or to the Carrier who performed
the transportation during which the loss, damage or delay took
place," the court found that by notifying Federal Express in a
timely manner, plaintiff complied with its obligation to timely
notify Union-Transport.4"'
VI. DOMESTIC SHIPPING CASES
In Kesel v. United Parcel Service, Inc., plaintiff brought suit
against UPS seeking recovery for the value of lost paintings.4" '
Plaintiff had selected seven paintings from studios in the
Ukraine for exhibition in San Francisco.40 2 Plaintiff asked his
assistant to ship the paintings to California through UPS, "to de-
clare the paintings at $13,500 for U.S. customs purposes and to
insure them for $60,000, a figure based upon [plaintiffs] belief
that the paintings could be sold in the United States for $8,000
to $10,000 a piece.40 3 The assistant took the paintings to the
customs commission in Odessa as required by law.404 The com-
mission determined that the works were not antique, and there-
fore assigned a value based on the cost of materials and
provided plaintiff's assistant with a permit listing the value of the
paintings as $558.405 When the assistant attempted to ship the
goods through UPS and insure them for $60,000, UPS refused
to insure them for more than the $558 value indicated on the
customs form.40 6 Nevertheless, the assistant shipped all seven
paintings in a single package.40 7 UPS's limitation of liability and
tariffs limited its liability to $100 per package.40 8 When the




401 339 F.3d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 2003).
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403 Id. at 850-51.
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the paintings to their receipt and storage at a Kentucky ware-
house, where they then "vanished like the Ark of the Cove-
nant."4 9 Plaintiff sued UPS in a California court, alleging
numerous federal and state claims, and seeking $60,000 in dam-
ages for the loss of the paintings.410 UPS removed the case to
federal court.411 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of UPS and limited its liability to $558.412 The circuit
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, noting that fed-
eral common law "delineates what a carrier must do to limit its
liability."41 Under the "released valuation doctrine . . . in ex-
change for a low rate, the shipper is deemed to have released
the carrier from liability beyond a stated amount."4 4 In order
for UPS to take advantage of the doctrine, it must have provided
the plaintiff with, "(1) a reasonable notice of limited liability,
and (2) a fair opportunity to purchase higher liability." '415 The
court found that the plaintiff was placed on notice of UPS's limi-
tation and that UPS had provided the plaintiff with increased
coverage ($558 of coverage as opposed to $100 per container),
and therefore UPS complied with federal common law.416 The
court noted that UPS does not have carte blanche to impose
arbitrary valuations on property.417 Here, the court noted that
UPS relied upon the customs documents setting the valuation of
the property.41 "
409 Id. at 850-51.
410 Id. at 851.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 852.
414 Id. (citing Deiro v. Am. Airlines, 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1987)) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
4,5 Id. (citing Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd., 186 F.3d 1190,
1198 (9th Cir. 1998)).
416 Id. at 852, 854.
417 Id. at 854.
418 Id.
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